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Abstract: Conservative is misinterpreted as capturing accountants 'tendency to require higher degree of 
verification for recognizing good news than bad news in financial statements. Under this interpretation of 
conservatism, earnings reflect bad news more quickly than good news. By using firms' stock returns to 
measure news, the asymmetric time lineless of recognizing good news and bad news can be examined as a 
measure of conservative behavior and as them an in question of this research in Irani and capital market. This 
research examines effect of composition of the board of directors of the companies listed in Tehran Stock 
Exchange (TSE) on conservative. Data analysis for seven years (2003-2010) shows that companies with a 
more in dependent board are more conservative. It means that these companies report bad news more 
timeliness than good news. The results of the research results confirm and reinforce previous researches. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This research on the subjectof conservatism has been concentrated, that the issue of the important issues of 
financial research. For this purpose to find an answer for this question that if there is any relationship 
between the composition of the board of directors of the companies listed in Tehran stock exchange and 
conservatism and if there is that there is directly or reverse relationship.Managers are motivated to hide 
losses to avoid expulsion before the end of being retried. Bear of losses, or to accept projects with negative 
net present value to can motivate shareholders to dismiss the director of the strategic. Using conservatism 
identified as losses speed and for the board of directors and shareholders evidence of inefficiency and 
operations for their loss to the pursuit and investigates the reasons for its alert. Because of such a discrepancy 
between managers interests, shareholders and other capital funders, corporate governance structures has 
been guided by the contracts effective supervision and management behavior, to reduce representative 
problems (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Literature in the field of research in corporate governance emphasis on the 
role of the members of out directores of the board of directors in reducing problems caused by the 
representation issue, through observation and guidance of executive management behavior designed to 
encourage (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
 
The board of directors as part of the main part of corporate governance beyond the management and 
shareholders played a major factor in charge of the stakeholders. The truth is that the companies, most 
managers pursuing their own interests instead of stakeholders interests (Scott, 2009). To solve this problem, 
there are two ways: first, to encourage managers to do the expected reward for them, "The second, 
thestrengthen of board of directors is a way to control the performance of managers (Scott, 2009). According 
to researches and the theory predict, whatever the board of directors has more independence, the better 
control the list of financial quality with be done. Conservatism means that it should be reported the least 
value of the assets and the most valuable value for debt. Revenues should not be identified soon but later and 
costs should not be identified as soon as possible. Hence, for the researcher this question appears whether 
the composition of the board of directors and the conservatism has relation. To answer this question 
Researcher should find answers for questions as follows: is there any relation between the timeliness of 
recognition of the bad news reflected in profit and the percent of out director’s managers in the board of 
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directors. Is there any relation between the good news reflected in profit and thepercent of out director’s 
managers in the board of directors? 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
The board of directors has an important role in a company and the Organization. The board of directors are 
responsible of supervising the quality of the existing information in that case they control senior managers to 
conduct right and to ensure that their activities are in accordance are in line with the interests of 
stockholders, investors, creditors and other voters who part the company with which are in contact. The 
composition and size of the Directory Company is an issue that is interested in recent years in International 
researches (Weisbach, 1998; Yermack, 1996). The existing research literature in contact with the supervision 
of the directors and the quality of accounting shows that the fraud is less in the financial statements of 
companies with number of members of out directors of board (Beasley, 1996; Dechow et al, 1996; Peasnell et 
al, 2000; klein, 2002).  
 
It seems the board of directors has a strategic role in the company and in supervision of the executive 
managers in order to protect shareholders. With regard to the independence of out directors, it is expected 
that higher percent ofthese members will lead to better guiding; including methods adopted more 
conservative volunteers’ methods in favor of identifying time of revenues. Beasley ( ); Dechow (1996); 
Farber ( ) are presented evidence that the companies with the board of directors with the majority of the 
members of out directors, less involved in accounting fraud. Beekes et al (2004) examines Relations between 
the percent of out directors of the board with conservatism. Ahmed & Duellman (2007) with the use of Basu 
model showed that higher percent of executive managers of the board of directors lead to the decrease 
conservatism. Effectiveness of The board of directors also can depend on the composition of the board of 
directors. One theory is that in the board of directors that considerable of them are members of out directors, 
sacrificial supervision is done on the Management, and therefore, can limit management authority. Byrd & 
Hickman (1992), and Rosenstein et al (1990) based on this confusion also noticed a positive relationship 
between out directors percent of the members of the board of directors and company performance. There are 
of researches show that a high level of out directors is inefficient in the board of directors, and have known it 
as due to change of strategic activities, the lack of business literacy to be effective and lack of true 
independence. The foundation of this view is that the members of the board of out directors usually a little bit 
information about the company and the necessary practical (Agrawal & Kroeber, 1996). 
 
Cadbury (1992) has recommended that the board of directors, there should be at least three members of out 
directors or non-execution in the board can be effective on the decisions of the board of directors. The board 
of directors has the highest authority in controlling system and the implementation of the dual role 
Ratification of the company. The board of directors role is to control and regulate Company’s Management 
behavior to make sure that management follow shareholders’ interests (Fama & Jensen, 1983). As long as 
there is less control from out of the company (for instance from financial markets), in this case there can be 
brought a domestic control insupervisory mechanism in the form of the required in the composition of the 
board of directors. More members of the out directors in the structure of the board of directors, more control 
and influence on the independent company can be done. 
 
It have been studied and determined in former researches that out directors have impact on a wide range of 
decisions such as dismiss of SEO (Weisbach, 1988), proposed bid (Byrd & Hickman, 1992) and resistance to 
paying the huge profits for acquiring major shares of other companies. In addition, many researchers have 
been emphasis on the role of out directores in the board of directors through observation and guidance on 
executive management behavior in reducing the issues caused by representation problems (Fama & Jensen, 
1983). Conclude that the board of directors that the members of non-executive are more, are more in line 
with shareholders’ interests and more likely to prevent poor performance of the board. Numerous studies 
show that existence of those non-executive members in the board of directors has a positive effect on the 
value of the company and wealth of Shareholders. 
 
Hypothesis: Skinner ( ), Trueman (1997), Beekes et.al (2004), Lafond & Roychowdhury (2008) believe 
that managers have much motivation to report bad news because they want to safe themselves from legal 
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responsibility. The result is that, it is expected that companies with good structure of corporate governance 
with more percent of out directors have been more conservative and reflect bad news more timeliness in 
profit.  
 
H1: there is a positive and significant relationship between the timeliness of bad news and the percentage of 
out directors. 
H2: there is a negative and significant relationship between the timeliness of good news and the percentage 
of out directors. 
 
Regard to the role and importance of to non-executive managers in the composition of the board of directors 
and the audit committee that has been fabricated in the principles of corporate governance by the Iranian 
stock & exchange organization(SEO) has been accepted, the results of this investigation will show to some 
extent that weather the presence of the members of non- executive in the composition of the board of 
directors is in connection with the level of companies’ accounting information quality or not? 
 
3. Methodology 
 
The data used in this study are from two databases: the information as the financial and information related 
to the output value and stock day price. Major parts of the information related to financial statements have 
been used from the software "RahavardNovin". In addition, some parts of the information have been used 
from the “TadbirPardaz” database. Information related to the return and the day values of the shares have 
been used from the database of “TadbirPardaz”. It is used Spss 18 for analyzing data and results. In some 
cases, it has used the website www.rdis.com's database that is owned by Islamic Project and study 
management center, for using financial statements. Date for returns and price of exact day of a share, it has 
used the RahavardNovin software database. Data collected were import in excel data files and after collecting 
all needed data, all calculations for analyzing were done. For final analyzing of data and results, it has used 
Spss 18. 
 
The period of this study is 2003 to 2010 and it is examined in Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE). It is known that 
all objects that have one common quality are called statistic society and in this study, the statistic society is all 
companies listed in TSE. For choosing from society and collecting sample, there are some qualifications as 
below: 
 All companies should be listed in TSE before 2003. 
 Because the fiscal year in Iran ends in 19 March, all should this fiscal year. 
 They should not have changed their operations or their end of fiscal year. 
 For calculating dependent "conservatism", it needs to find and calculate market value of company's 
equity in end of year, so company's shares should be transacted in February and March (Esfand, the 
last month in Iran calendar). 
 
Method of sampling is judicative. By these qualifications, the sample of 61 company’s means of 488 company-
years in the period of 2003 to 2010 is selected. Following Beekes et al. (2004) we will use the Basu (1997) 
reverse regression model between earnings per share and stock returns. For this reason, we have estimated 
12-month stock returns over the fiscal year in order to proxy for the news about a firm’s performance that is 
publicly available. Basu (1997) introduces adummyvariable (D) in the reverse regression model based on the 
assumption that earnings are expected to be highly correlated with market returns in periods of depression 
in market values than in periods of prosperity on market values. This qualitative variable is given the value of 
one (1) when returns are negative and zero (0) if they are positive. Under these assumptions, the final form of 
the Basu (1997) model is as follows: 
 
Model 1: Eit=b1+b2*Rit+b3*D+b4*Rit*D+eit 
itE = accounting earnings for the year t and the company i 
itR = year return for the year t and the company i 
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itD  This qualitative variable is given the value of one (1) when returns are negative and zero (0) if they are 
positive 
 
The regression coefficients b2 and b4 can be seen as the reaction of earnings to “good news” and “bad news” 
respectively. An indication of conservatism could be a positive sign of the coefficient b4 as well as the 
increase of the coefficient of multiple determinations in periods of “bad news”. The intercept of the regression 
equation, b1, will be expected to have a negative sign if conservatism affects earnings, otherwise it will have a 
positive sign. Finally, the coefficient b3 may be explained as a setback of previous year’s market information 
to current value decreases. “When b3 is positive over provisioning is reversed as a prior year adjustment. 
When b3 is negative we infer that deferred income recognition is scaled down”. Following Beekes et al. 
(2004) we extended the Basu (1997) model to examine the association between accounting quality and board 
composition, by introducing a dummy variable OD into the model which takes the value of one (1) if the 
number of outside board members is above the sample median and zero (0) otherwise. The new variable then 
is interacted with the other variables in the standard Basu (1997) model as it is depicted in the following 
equation: 
 
Model 2: EPSit=b0+b1Rit+b2Dit+b3Rit*Dit+b4ODit+b5Dit*OD+b6Rit*ODit+b7Rit*Dit*ODit+eit 
 
Where Rit is the raw stock return of firm i during the fiscal year t. EPSit is the annual earnings per share of firm 
i for year t. Dit is a dummy variable taking the value of (1) if Rit is negative and zero otherwise. ODitis a dummy 
variable taking the value of (1) if the number of outside members on the board of directors is above the 
sample median and zero otherwise. It is expected that firms with above the sample median number of outside 
directors (OD equals1) will be better monitors of business activities and adopt a conservative reporting 
attitude due to agreater presence of outsiders. Hypothesis 3 declares that firms with an increased proportion 
of outside directors on the board will be more conservative than firms with a small fraction of outside 
directors.We expect this to be represented by a significant positive coefficient on the R*D*OD 
interactionterm.Finally, hypothesis 4 predicts that firms with above the median level of outsiders on the 
boardwill be more conservative on the recognition of good news. If this is true, then the coefficient b1which 
captures the timeliness of good news (when OD equals zero) will be larger than (b1 + b6) and statistically 
significant. Therefore, b6 will be negative and significant. Beyond the aforementioned analysis, we will re-
estimate model 2 by including the control variables, advantage, firm size options. 
Consequently, model 3 becomes: 
 
Model 3: EPSit=b0+b1Rit+b2Dit+b3Rit*Dit+b4ODit+b5Dit*ODit+b6Rit*ODit+b7Rit*Dit*ODit+b8LEVit+b9SIZEit +eit 
 
It=Financial leverage that is calculated by the ratio of total debt to the total assets 
It= Company's size is the natural algorithm of total assets in end of the year  
 
4. Results 
 
Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the sample variables from 2003 to 2010 
Coefficient average standard deviation median 
tiR , 
0.41 0.77 0.375 
tiEPS , 
890 991 883 
 0.54 0.20 0.6 
tiLev , 0.74 0.37 0.7 
 
5.76 0.58 5.69 
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Sample consists of 61 companies listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange from 2003 to 2010. March fiscal year 
end firms are included in the sample. Rit is the raw stock returns of firm i at the end of the fiscal year and Pit 
is the stock price of each firm at the end of the fiscal year. EPS it is the annual earnings per share of firm i for 
year t. OUT DIR it is the ratio of outside directors defined as those who are not an active or retired employee 
of the firm, do not have any close business ties and are not representatives of a major shareholder of the firm. 
LEV it is the financial advantage measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets. The SIZE it of the firm is 
measured as the natural logarithm of firm’s total assets at the end of the fiscal year. 
 
Table 2: Pearson Correlation coefficients among sample variables (2003–2010) 
coefficient R EPS OUTDIR LEV SIZE 
R  1 .286** -.015 .032 -.008 
  .000 .763 .505 .875 
EPS  .286** 1 .128** .052 -.048 
 .000  .008 .288 .318 
OUTDIR  -.015 .128** 1 -.090 .193** 
 .763 .008  .064 .000 
LEV  .032 .052 -.090 1 -.145** 
 .505 .288 .064  .003 
SIZE  -.008 -.048 .193** -.145** 1 
 .875 .318 .000 .003  
 
Pearson correlation coefficients of the sample variables. P-values are in the parenthesis. *, **, ***Significance 
at a = 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.Sample consists of 61 companies listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange 
from 2003 to 2010. March fiscal year end firms are included in the sample. Rit is the raw stock returns of firm 
i at the end of the fiscal year and Pit is the stock price of each firm at the end of the fiscal year. EPSit is the 
annual earnings per share of firm i for year t. OUTDIRit is the ratio of outside directors defined as those who 
are not an active or retired employee of the firm, do not have any close business ties and are not 
representatives of a major shareholder of the firm. LEVit is the financial advantage measured as the ratio of 
total debt to total assets. The SIZEit of the firm is measured as the natural logarithm of firm’s total assets at 
the end of the fiscal year. 
 
Results on conservatism and board composition: The relative results are presented in Table 3. Model 1 is 
the standard Basu (1997) model that examines the timeliness of good and bad news. Coefficient b1 is 
insignificant indicating that firms are not timely reporters of good news. On the contrary, coefficient b3 is 
positive and significant suggesting that bad news is reflected in earnings on a timelier basis. Models 1 and 2 
include the additional dummy variable OD and its interaction term with negative returns. OD takes the value 
of one (1) if the number of outside directors serving on the board is above the sample median and zero 
otherwise. In both models coefficient b7 (OD*D*R) is positive and significant as it was predicted, thus 
verifying hypothesis 1 (0.91 and 0.88 respectively). This result suggests that there is a greater timeliness in 
earnings relative to bad news in firms with above the median level of outsiders. Put it another way, there is 
lower sensitivity to bad news in firms with low outsider representation. However, the results provided by 
models 2d, 2e and 2f do not support our fourth hypothesis. Coefficient b6, which captures the timeliness of 
good news, is insignificant in all mode specifications. This actually means that there is no incremental 
improvement in the speed of integrating good news into earnings for firms with increased board 
independence. Still the fact that b7 is significant confirms that outside directors influence financial reporting 
only in terms of recognition of bad news. These results are consistent to Beekes et al. (2004) and Lafond and 
Roychowdhury (2008) and Bushman et al. (2004a) who found a low timeliness measure of Greek firms. 
 
Sample consists of 61 companies listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange from 2003 to 2010. March fiscal year 
end firms are included in the sample. Rit is the raw stock returns of firm i at the end of the fiscal year and Pit is 
the stock price of each firm at the end of the fiscal year. Dit is a dummy variable taking the value of (1) if Rit is 
negative and zero otherwise. ODit is a dummy variable taking the value of (1) if the number of outsider 
members on the board of directors is above the sample median and zero otherwise. LEVit is the financial 
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advantage measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets. The SIZEit of the firm is measured as the natural 
logarithm of firm’s total assets at the end of the fiscal year. 
 
Table 3: the relation between earnings conservatism and board composition 
     
 
 
 
 
 
    b0 Model 
0.532 157.73 
 
(0.000) 
      55.09 
(16.019) 
(0.000) 
253.9 
(2.544) 
(0.011) 
-1.994 
(-1.557) 
(0.118) 
665.78 
(14.739) 
(0.000) 
1 
T 
sig 
0.534 68.648 
 
(0.000) 
  6.83 
(4.384) 
(0.000) 
-3.757 
(-0.854) 
(0.393) 
-206.84 
(-1.577) 
(0.12) 
153 
(2.126) 
(0.034) 
55 
(15.338) 
(0.000) 
270.91 
(2.673) 
(0.008) 
-2.019 
(-4.683) 
(0.000) 
615.1 
11.04) 
(0.000) 
2 
T 
sig 
0.532 53.242 
 
(0.000) 
-37.641 
(-0.667) 
(0.499) 
-4.128 
(-0.046) 
(0.963) 
6.83 
(4.385) 
(0.000) 
-3.86 
(-0.875) 
(0.382) 
-209.26 
(-1.566) 
(0.118) 
149.8 
(2.030) 
(0.043) 
55 
(15.295) 
(0.000) 
273 
(2.686) 
(0.008) 
2.02 
(4.676) 
(0.000) 
838.136 
(2.418) 
(0.016) 
3 
T 
sig 
 
Meaningfulness of the regression functions: According to table four, because calculated F-stat of the 
models in 95% confidence ( = 5%) in all models are more than F-stat in statistical table, so 0H  that says 
regression model is not significant, is rejected. It is obvious that by rejecting 0H , regression models are 
significant. 
 
Table 4: Regression Results 
 
Auto correlation: Durbin Watson stat is used to identify of being or not the auto correlation in residuals. 
Therefore, there are: 
H0= there is auto regression in residuals  
H1= there is not auto regression in residuals 
 
If this stat is above 1.5 and less than 2.5, H0 is rejected and H1 is admitted. 
 
Table 5: Results of Durbin Watson 
model R R square Adjusted R square Durbin Watson stat 
1 0.732a 0.536 0.532 1.607 
2 0.736a 0.542 0.534 1.602 
3 0.737a 0.543 0.532 1.594 
a. Predictors: (Constant), size, r*d, OD, lev, r, d, d*OD, r*OD, r*d*OD 
b. Dependent Variable: eps   
Therefore, as table 5 shows, Durbin Watson stat in all models are around 1.6 and it shows H0 is rejected and 
H1 is accepted. 
 
p-value F-stat Average of squares df Sum of squares 
 
Model 
0.000 
 
 
 
 
0.000 
 
 
 
0.000 
157.73 
 
66.50 3 199.50 regression 
1 0.42 410 172.85 errors 
 413 372.35 total 
68.648 
 
28.83 7 201.83 regression 
2 0.42 406 170.52 errors 
 413 372.35 total 
53.24 
 
22.45 9 202 regression 
3 0.42 404 170.3 errors 
 413 372.3 total 
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Normality distribution of errors by average of zero for hypo 1 & 2: As graph 1, 2 and 3 show distribution 
of errors is normal. Standard deviation of distribution of errors is 0.996, 0.991 and 0.989 for models 1, 2 and 
3 respectively. 
 
Graph 1  
                 
      
Graph 2 
           
    
Graph 3 
                
 
5. Concluding Remarks and Future Research 
 
The aim of this paper was to examine how the informational quality of annual accounting earnings,varies 
according to the composition of the board of directors, within the Iran capital market.For this reason it is 
selected a sample of 61 companies all listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange, withfull financial data and 
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information on the structure of the board of directors from 2003 to 2010.The empirical findings suggest that 
the number of outside directors serving on the board affects earnings relative to bad news in firms with 
above the median level of outsiders. This actually means that there is no incremental improvement in the 
speed of recognizing good news into earnings for firms with increased board independence. However, two 
limitations need to be mentioned. First, the empirical tests conducted in this study may suffer from an 
omitted variables problem. The second limitation arises from possible data measurement errors. Despite the 
aforementioned limitations, our findings could be proved valuable to investors, managers and regulators 
since they have implications for all these related parties. Financial statement information is the main path 
managers use in order to communicate significant information to investors. If this information is reported in 
a conservative manner, it enables market participants to evaluate a firm’s future accounting earnings and 
equity. Some further issues need to be examined. First, it will be interesting to consider the effect of audit 
committees on the quality of published accounting earnings. Furthermore, some variables such as returns 
have more than one definition like the one the returns of buying – holding shares and these other definition 
can use in other study. In addition, it can be studied in different industries.  
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